soft commodities from Ukraine. Only upon
opening of the grain corridor under the UN in-
itiative, did we reached meaningful export vol-
ume allowing us to maintain a certain level of
our activities. Before that, our operations
were lossmaking.
Switching now to segments.
The Oilseed Processing activities in FY2022
resulted in a negative EBITDA of US$ 70 mil-
lion, mostly suffering from enormous US$ 185
million losses related to inventories, mainly
from revaluation of the stock as well as a
write-off of destroyed inventories, reserve for
inventories located on the territories occupied
by Russia and the impairment of goodwill and
property, which were recognized in the H2
FY2022 because of the Russian invasion of
Ukraine. Since the start of the war, our sale
volumes reduced though the crush margin el-
evated, driven by the growing global prices for
sunflower oil and suppressed domestic prices
for sunflower seeds.
EBITDA of the Infrastructure and Trading
segment amounted to US$ 237 million in
FY2022, down 34% y-o-y. Avere non-Ukrain-
ian trading activities contributed more than
half of that, resulting in US$ 134 million
EBITDA. Grain export value chain in Ukraine
generated US$ 103 million EBITDA, including
US$ 82 million losses due to damage and
write-off of inventories and provisions created
for accounts receivable. Generally, the grain
export operations in Ukraine were loss-mak-
ing in Q4 FY2022, reflecting difficulties in es-
tablishing efficient alternative export routes.
The Farming segment generated the
EBITDA of US$ 219 million in FY2022, down
52% y-o-y, including US$ 145 million losses
stemming from the impairment of assets and
losses of inventories owing to the ongoing
war in Ukraine. Farming earnings were se-
cured in the first half of the year, while in the
second half the business was operationally
loss-making. On top of that, almost 800 thou-
sand tons of corn and sunflower seeds of in-
house produce remained unsold as of 30
June 2022.
Strong performance in FY2021 and in the first
half of FY2022 generated a substantial liquid-
ity buffer, so we started returning capital to
our investors. In August 2021, we approved a
large share buyback program, and by Feb-
ruary 2022, we purchased over 6.6 million
shares on the market, or 7.9% of shares is-
sued, to treasury stock for a total considera-
tion of US$ 97 million. In December 2021, we
completed an early redemption of the remain-
ing US$ 213 million of our US$ 500 million
2022 Eurobonds. All of that was pre-war. No
need to say, that our approach has totally
changed since 24 February 2022. With
stretched liquidity and huge uncertainty pre-
vailing, the Board of Directors decided to
recommend shareholders not to pay divi-
dends for the year ending 30 June 2022.
Due to liquidity difficulties, our ability to ser-
vice debt has suffered. While we kept paying
interest on all our indebtedness, we were
forced to launch the negotiations with banks
to obtain waivers on the repayment of the
loan principal until 30 September 2022,
which we managed to achieve. However, due
to the continued Russian aggression, we en-
tered again a new round of negotiations. As
of the date of publication of this report, the
majority of our creditors have signed such
waivers, and some of them are still in the pro-
cess, providing us with “reservation of rights”
letters. Based on the progress achieved, we
feel a certain comfort that we will manage to
reach agreements with all creditors on the
postponement of the loan principal repay-
ment until 30 June 2023 subject to other
terms and conditions. We are grateful to all
our creditors for standing with us during these
difficult times.
Next year risks and challenges
FY2023 will probably be the most challeng-
ing season in our history, and it is likely to be
a story not about the profits, but rather about
the liquidity management and preserving op-
erations. We do not provide any guidance for
volumes or margins, as these components
simply cannot be predicted, but rather focus
on the risks we face today.
We entered the new season with a record
brought forward stock of over 2.5 million tons
of grains, oilseeds, sunflower oil and sun-
flower meal worth of nearly US$ 900 million,
creating a huge pressure on our storage ca-
pacities in the view of the approaching new
harvest campaign. Later on, some relief was
provided by the grain deal signed in July
2022 with the help of UN and Turkey. To
some extent, it allowed to avoid a full collapse
of grain storage and logistic infrastructure
caused by the approaching harvest in
Ukraine. However, the recent Russian state-
ments under far-fetched pretext to unilaterally
terminate the grain deal create a huge uncer-
tainty regarding its continuation going for-
ward.
While development of the alternative export
routes is always on our radar and we have an
action plan prepared for that case, it will be
very difficult to increase volumes substantially
above the levels achieved in Q4 FY2022 if the
Black Sea is inaccessible for us for exports.
What is more, even if the grain deal is ex-
tended, it remains subject to the risk of sabo-
tage from Russia. We have already seen
that Russian representatives deliberately de-
layed the inspection of vessels, and the out-
bound queue waiting to leave the Bosporus in
late October exceeded 100 vessels carrying
over 2 million tons of agricultural products.
Some vessels had to wait for more than 20
days to be inspected. Such delays extend
voyages and substantially increase logistics
costs, eroding profit margins.
No matter what, we will keep working on es-
tablishing the alternative export routes,
though a significant capital expenditure
would be required to increase export vol-
umes. We preliminarily estimate such invest-
ment needs at over US$ 170 million, covering
rail containers for vegetable oil, grain and
meal; rail flatcars; sea and river vessels;
trucks; and purchase or construction of over-
land transshipment facilities allowing us to
smooth the connections between the Ukrain-
ian and EU railway. We would like not to over-
invest, but we must have plan B considering
the size of our own production. Needless to
mention the alternative export routes are a
way more expensive compared to the trans-
portation via Black Sea.
Even if the grain corridor remains functioning,
a big risk of destruction or severe damage
of our key port infrastructure still exists. We
have already observed missile attacks on
grain and vegetable oil assets in Mykolaiv
port. In that case, we may face an urgent
need to acquire some port facilities in neigh-
boring countries or in the other parts of
Ukraine.
Besides the investments in the inland logis-
tics and port infrastructure to maintain our ex-
port capabilities, we face another challenge –
securing the increased level of working
capital, since soaring soft commodity prices
and an extended logistics interval has had an
ongoing negative effect on our cash cycle.
In our situation the future is not clear, and, de-
pending on the abovementioned needs, we
might be in urgent search of capital to fi-
nance our survival. Given that the credit
market is closed to Ukrainian corporates at
the moment, equity funding might be the last
and only option available. Acting in advance,
the Board of Directors proposed shareholders
approve the creation of the authorized
share capital, which might be used at the
Board’s discretion to issue equity when such
need appears. As a Chairman of the Board, I
am thankful to all shareholders who sup-
ported such decision at the extraordinary
general meeting in September 2022.
In addition to the risks presented above, one
additional threat appeared just recently: roll-
ing blackouts across Ukraine caused by
the recent multiple Russian missile attacks on
the Ukrainian civil energy infrastructure. Rus-
sia destroyed materially the Ukrainian power
stations and damaged the electricity distribu-
tion infrastructure. It caused power supply
outages. Our most exposed business is
Oilseed Processing, which stands for over
70% of the Group’s total electricity consump-
tion and is our most important business line